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Abstract—The ubiquitous webcam indicator LED is an im-
portant privacy feature which provides a visual cue that the
camera is turned on. We describe how to disable the LED on
a class of Apple internal iSight webcams used in some versions
of MacBook laptops and iMac desktops. This enables video to
be captured without any visual indication to the user and can
be accomplished entirely in user space by an unprivileged (non-
root) application.
The same technique that allows us to disable the LED, namely
reprogramming the firmware that runs on the iSight, enables
a virtual machine escape whereby malware running inside a
virtual machine reprograms the camera to act as a USB Human
Interface Device (HID) keyboard which executes code in the host
operating system.
We build two proofs-of-concept: (1) an OS X application,
iSeeYou, which demonstrates capturing video with the LED
disabled; and (2) a virtual machine escape that launches
Terminal.app and runs shell commands. To defend against
these and related threats, we build an OS X kernel extension,
iSightDefender, which prohibits the modification of the iSight’s
firmware from user space.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the 2008 school year, the Lower Merion
School District provided a MacBook laptop to each enrolled
student. These laptops came pre-loaded with the LANrev
remote administration tool (RAT) which allowed school district
officials to, among other things, capture images from the
MacBooks’ built-in iSight webcam. During the following 18
months, officials captured more than 30 thousand images from
these webcams [5, 6]. The first indication that images were
being captured was every time the software took a picture, the
green indicator LED would briefly illuminate [5, 6, 40]. Some
teachers were so concerned by this they they covered the lens
of the webcams on their own laptops [6]. Here, the indicator
LED worked exactly as it was supposed to and alerted the
users that they were being photographed.
The possibility that a webcam could be capturing pictures
without the LED illuminating has led to suggestions that
owners should tape over the webcam [41] as well as products
designed to cover the camera such as stickers [10] and the
amusingly named iPatch [53].
This incident illustrates the dangers of passive sensors like
cameras and microphones. Unlike active input devices like
keyboards and mice that require user actions to provide input,
a passive sensor requires no action on the part of the user to
capture input. Indeed, a user is typically unaware that input is
being captured at all unless specific mechanisms are built into
(a) Image sensor (front)
(b) Image sensor (back)
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Fig. 1: The iSight from a 2008 MacBook we studied.
the technology to indicate that the sensor is currently in use.
Such mechanisms include camera-use indicator LEDs, shutter
sounds on cell phone cameras, and GPS-use indicator icons
on mobile devices and laptops.
In the past few years, the ever-expanding set of sensors
present in commodity laptops and smart phones has prompted
the security and privacy community to begin researching ways
to detect and limit the undesired use of sensors [20, 22, 24, 25,
29]. At the same time, researchers have demonstrated attacks
exploiting the presence of sensors such as a clickjacking
attacks against Adobe Flash to gain access to the camera and
microphone [23] from a malicious web page and exfiltrating
audio from microphones in modern automobiles [11]. (See
Section II for more examples.)
Our results in this paper demonstrate that, at least in some
cases, people have been correct to worry about malware
covertly capturing images and video. We show a vulnerability
in the iSight webcam that affects a particular range of Apple
computers — including the MacBooks given to the students
in the Lower Merion School District — that can be exploited
to turn on the camera and capture images and video without
the indicator illuminating.
At a high level, our investigation of the iSight revealed
that it is designed around a microprocessor and a separate
image sensor with an indicator LED sitting between them such
that whenever the image sensor is transmitting images to the
microcontroller, a hardware interlock illuminates the LED. We
show how to reprogram the microcontroller with arbitrary, new
firmware. This in turn enables us to reconfigure the image
sensor, allowing us to bypass the hardware interlock and
disable the LED. We also show a new method of performing
a virtual machine escape based on our ability to reprogram
the microcontroller.
Specifically, our technical contributions in this paper are
five-fold:
1) We describe the architecture of the Apple internal iSight
webcam found in previous generation Apple products
including the iMac G5 and early Intel-based iMacs,
MacBooks, and MacBook Pros until roughly 2008
(Section III).
2) We demonstrate how to bypass the hardware interlock that
the iSight uses to turn on the indicator LED whenever
the camera is capturing images or video (Section IV)
and provide a proof-of-concept user space application,
iSeeYou, to do so (Section V).
3) We demonstrate how to use the capability developed
to bypass the hardware interlock to achieve a virtual
machine escape (Section VI).
4) We develop an OS X kernel extension, iSightDefender,
to defend against these attacks (Section VII).
5) We sketch the design space for building a secure camera
module (Section VIII).
The ability to bypass the interlock raises serious privacy
concerns and the technical means by which we accomplish
it raises additional security concerns which we discuss in
Section IX.
Threat model. To mount our main attack where we capture
video without any external indication to the victim, we assume
that an attacker is able to run native code on the victim’s
computer as an unprivileged user. Further, we assume the code
is unencumbered by defenses such as Apple’s App Sandbox [2]
which is used for applications downloaded from the Mac App
Store but by little else. This assumption is quite mild and
would typically be satisfied by malware such as RATs.
For the virtual machine escape, we assume the attacker has
code running locally in the virtual machine and with whatever
privileges the guest OS requires to communicate with USB
devices. We also assume that the virtual machine monitor
has exposed the iSight device to the virtual machine. This
second assumption is quite strong as virtual machine monitors
typically do not expose USB devices to the guest OS unless
the user specifically configures it to do so, for example to use
video conferencing software.
Generality of results. We stress that our main result —
disabling the iSight LED — only applies to the first generation
internal iSight webcams and we make no claims of security or
insecurity of later models, including the most recent (renamed)
FaceTime cameras. The virtual machine escape described in
Section VI likely holds for other USB devices that use the
Cypress EZ-USB chip used in the iSight, but we have not yet
tested other devices.
II. RELATED WORK
General purpose computers contain a variety of processors
designed for performing specialized tasks other than general-
purpose computation. Examples include graphics processing
units (GPUs) which produce video output; processors in
network interface controllers (NICs) which perform network
packet processing; microcontrollers in perhipherals such as
keyboards, mice, and webcams; microcontrollers in laptop
batteries; and, in some systems, baseboard management
controllers (BMCs) which enables out-of-band system man-
agement independent of the host computer’s CPU.
Security researchers have only recently begun examining
these additional processors and the firmware that runs on them.
In many cases, the designers of these systems appear not to
have appreciated the security implications of their interfaces
and implementations.
Perhaps the most well-studied processor apart from the
CPU is the GPU. Vasiliadis et al. [54] demonstrate using
the GPU to harden malware against detection by using the
GPU to implement unpacking and runtime polymorphism.
Ladakis et al. [31] use the GPU’s direct memory access (DMA)
capability to monitor the system’s keyboard buffer to build a
keylogger. Beyond GPU malware itself, researchers have used
the GPU to accelerate malware detection [30] and intrusion
detection systems [46].
Duflot and Perez [17] demonstrate exploiting a NIC to
achieve arbitrary code execution. In follow up work, Duflot
et al. [18] build a NIC malware detection framework.
Miller [36] demonstrates how to communicate with Apple
laptop batteries using the System Management Bus, authenti-
cate to the battery to “unseal” it, and change both configuration
values and firmware. This enables overcharging the battery
resulting in overheating and, potentially, leading to a fire.
Tereshkin and Wojtczuk [52] introduce the concept of a
“Ring −3” rootkit which runs on Intel’s Active Management
Technology (AMT) hardware which has a processor indepen-
dent of the host CPU with a separate interface to the NIC and
DMA access to main memory.
In a very similar vein, Farmer [21] discusses weaknesses
and vulnerabilities in the Intelligent Platform Management
Interface (IPMI) — the standard interface to the baseboard
management controller (BMC). Like AMT, a BMC has direct
access to the host system but its operation is completely
independent making exploits both extremely powerful and
difficult to detect. Moore [39] builds on this work to produce
a penetration tester’s guide for examining IPMI and BMCs.
A webcam is just a particular type of sensor attached
to a computing device. Others include microphones, ac-
celerometers, and GPS sensors. Our work joins an emerging
line or research on the security and privacy implications of
such sensors. For example, Schlegel et al. [50] show how
to use a mobile phone’s microphone to extract credit card
numbers and PINs from spoken and tone-based interfaces.
Marquardt et al. [34], Miluzzo et al. [38], Owusu et al. [43]
use smartphone accelerometers to extract information about
key presses. Checkoway et al. [11] extract audio and GPS
coordinates from automobiles. Templeman et al. [51] use
smartphone cameras to covertly take pictures which are then
used to create 3D models of physical spaces.
Our virtual machine escape (Section VI) is not the first
to emulate a USB Human Interface Device (HID) such as
a mouse or keyboard. Wang and Stavrou [56] among other
things, use a compromised smart phone to act as a USB HID
keyboard and send key presses to the host system. Kennedy
and Kelley [28] use a small microcontroller to interact with
the Windows Powershell. Pisani et al. [45] similarly describe
having USB devices pose as HID keyboards to control the
computer. Elkins [19] adds a RF receiver for remote controlling
a fake HID keyboard.
III. INTERNAL ISIGHT ARCHITECTURE
This section describes the architecture of the internal iSight
webcam in sufficient detail to understand how the multi-step
attack described in Section IV works. Readers who are already
familiar with the iSight or the Cypress EZ-USB or who are not
interested in the low-level details of the device are encouraged
to skip directly to Section IV and use this section and Figure 2,
in particular, as a reference as needed.
The internal iSight consists of a Cypress CY7C68013A
EZ-USB FX2LP, a Micron MT9V112 CMOS digital image
sensor, a 16 byte configuration EEPROM, and an indicator
LED (see Figure 1). A block diagram is given in Figure 2.
A. Cypress EZ-USB
The host computer interacts with the iSight entirely through
a USB connection to the Cypress EZ-USB. The EZ-USB is
responsible for handling all USB requests and sending replies
including video data.
The EZ-USB has an internal Intel 8051-compatible mi-
crocontroller core and 16 kB of on-chip RAM accessible as
both code and data “main” memory1 but lacks persistent
storage [13]. In general, the firmware for the 8051 core can
be located in one of three locations: (1) external memory such
as flash or EPROM attached to the EZ-USB address/data bus;
(2) an I2C EEPROM; or (3) loaded from USB. The iSight
loads its firmware at boot from the host computer over USB
(see Section IV-B).
B. Micron digital image sensor
The Micron digital image sensor is a low-power system-
on-a-chip (SOC) capable of producing an image in several
formats. The image sensor is configured by the I2C interface
which can read from and write to several hundred configuration
1The standard 8051 is a Harvard architecture which has separate code and
data memory differentiated by hardware signals. In the configuration used by
the iSight, the signals are combined effectively giving a single main memory
address space.
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Fig. 2: Internal iSight architecture block diagram consisting of
a Cypress EZ-USB, a Micron digital image sensor, a 16 byte
configuration EEPROM, and an indicator LED.
registers [35]. In addition to the I2C interface, several hardware
signals influence the operation of sensor.
The most important signals from our perspective are the
active-low #RESET and active-high STANDBY signals. The
corresponding hardware pins are connected directly to the EZ-
USB’s general purpose I/O (GPIO) pins. As shown in Figure 2,
#RESET is connected to pin 0 of GPIO port A and STANDBY
is connected to pin 3 of GPIO port D. The other connection
between the image sensor and the EZ-USB shown in Figure 2
DOUT[7:0]→FD[7:0] is an 8 bit unidirectional bus which
transfers pixel data to the EZ-USB’s FIFO interface. Other,
less important, control signals are omitted from the diagram.
The #RESET signal performs a hardware reset, resetting all
configuration registers to their default value. The STANDBY
signal controls controls output enable and power down
functions. That is, when STANDBY is asserted, the image
sensor stops producing data on DOUT[7:0] which enters the
high impedance state as well as allowing the image sensor to
transition to a low power state.
C. Configuration EEPROM
The first byte of the 16 byte EEPROM controls whether the
EZ-USB loads its firmware from USB or from the EEPROM
itself. When set to load firmware from USB, as the iSight does,
the EEPROM contains the USB vendor ID (VID), product
TABLE I: Relation between the PD3 GPIO, the STANDBY




ID (PID), device release number, and a configuration byte
for the initial device enumeration. Once the EZ-USB has
enumerated using the VID, PID, and release values, software
on the host computer can load the firmware. The iSight initially
enumerates with vendor ID 0x05ac (Apple, Inc.) and product
ID 0x8300 (Built-in iSight (no firmware loaded)).
D. Indicator LED
Since the purpose of the indicator LED is to illuminate
whenever the camera is capturing video, a LED driver circuit is
connected directly to the STANDBY input of the image sensor
(see Figure 2). In this way, whenever PD3 is high — that is,
STANDBY is asserted — the LED is off and whenever PD3
is low — so STANDBY is deasserted and the image sensor is
producing output — the LED is on. Since the LED is controlled
by the same output that controls STANDBY, there is no danger
that firmware on the EZ-USB could deassert STANDBY and
turn the LED off (see Table I). However, as we demonstrate
in Section IV, we can bypass the STANDBY signal such that
changing PD3 allows us to control the LED without affecting
the operation of the image sensor.
IV. DISABLING THE INDICATOR LED
Disabling the indicator LED on the iSight entails two
requirements. First, as described in Section III, the indicator
LED is directly connected to the STANDBY pin on the image
sensor. In order to disable the LED, we need to keep STANDBY
asserted. Since asserting STANDBY will disable the image
sensor output, we need to configure the image sensor to ignore
STANDBY before we assert this signal. Second, we need a
way to modify the firmware on the EZ-USB to in order to
configure the image sensor appropriately as well as keep
STANDBY asserted whenever we want the LED to stay off.
A. Bypassing the STANDBY signal
The Micron image sensor has a 16 bit configuration register,
RESET (which is distinct from the #RESET power on reset
signal). RESET is addressable from the I2C interface at address
0x0D in register page 0 [35]. The most significant 8 bits
control hardware clocks and how bad frames should be handled
which are of no interest to us and can be left as 0. The least
significant 8 bits have the following functionality as described
in the image sensor data sheet [35, Table 13]:
Bit 7. Prevent STANDBY from affecting entry to or exit
from the low-power state if set.
Bit 6. Prevent STANDBY from contributing to output enable
control if set.
Bit 5. Reset the SOC (but not the sensor) if set.
Bit 4. Disable pixel data output if set.
Bit 3. Chip enable. Normal operation if set, no sensor
readout otherwise.
Bit 2. Software standby if set, otherwise normal operation.
Bit 1. Restart reading an image frame.
Bit 0. Reset the sensor to its default state if set, normal
operation otherwise.
Bits 0, 1, and 5 are of no interest and can be set to 0
but the remaining 5 bits enable us to bypass the STANDBY
signal while still maintaining normal operation. This includes
entering a (software) standby state and disabling output when
appropriate.
When the iSight is first powered up (or, more precisely,
when #RESET becomes deasserted), the RESET register has
value 0x0008; that is, normal operation and STANDBY affects
the low-power state and output enable. If RESET is set to
0x00c8, then the camera has normal operation but STANDBY
is effectively bypassed. When it becomes desirable for the
camera to enter the standby state, RESET can be set to
0x00d4 which disables output and enters the software standby
state.
With RESET set to either 0x00c8 or 0x00d4, the
hardware STANDBY signal is ignored. This enables the use
of the EZ-USB PD3 output to control the LED independent
of the standby state of the image sensor.
B. Programming the EZ-USB
When the iSight is first powered, it checks the config-
uration EEPROM and then waits for programming over
USB (see Section III-C). The AppleUSBVideoSupport I/O Kit
driver matches the vendor ID (VID) and product ID (PID).
The driver loads and the AppleUSBCamera::start()
function downloads the camera’s firmware (stored in the
gTheFirmware array) to the EZ-USB using a series of
vendor-specific USB “Firmware Load” device requests [13,
Section 3.8]. The camera will then reenumerate and function
as a webcam.
One approach to change the firmware on the camera is to
modify the AppleUSBVideoSupport driver to contain different
firmware. A second approach would be to provide a new
driver that matches the VID/PID and provides a higher probe
score [3]. The new driver would run at system start up instead
of Apple’s driver and download the new firmware to the
camera. These approaches have two major drawbacks. The
first drawback is that they rely on programming the iSight
when it is in its unprogrammed state which only happens
when the camera is first powered by the USB bus. The second
drawback is that root access is required in order to modify
the existing driver or load a new driver.
A third approach overcomes both drawbacks by letting the
iSight be programmed with the legitimate firmware when it
is first powered. Once the firmware has been loaded onto the
camera, it can be reprogrammed at any time using “Firmware
Load” vendor-specific USB device requests. Furthermore, it
can be reprogrammed from any user space process.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
The discussion in Section IV shows that, in principle, it is
possible to modify the legitimate firmware to disable the LED.
In this section, we describe the proof-of-concept application,
iSeeYou we created which reprograms the iSight to add the
capability to enable or disable the LED using a new vendor-
specific USB device request.
A. Modifying the firmware
Although one could reimplement the camera functionality,
we opted to create new firmware by appending new binary
code to the legitimate firmware and patching it to call our
new code. The first step is to extract the legitimate firmware
from the AppleUSBVideoSupport driver.2
The firmware consists of an 8 byte header followed by a
sequence of triples: a 2 byte size, a 2 byte address, and size-
bytes of data. This format corresponds exactly to the “C2
Load” format of the EEPROM for loading firmware directly
from the EEPROM [13, Table 3-6]. Each triple specifies the
data that should be written to the EZ-USB’s main memory at a
given address. By stripping off the header and the final triple,3
we can construct the “raw” firmware image. The raw firmware
can then be analyzed, for example, by using IDA Pro.
The raw firmware is structured similarly to sample code
provided in the Cypress EZ-USB FX2LP Development Kit [14]
including a hardware initialization function and USB events
that are serviced by a main loop based on state bits set by
interrupt handlers.
To the legitimate firmware, we add two bits of state,
“is the sensor in software standby or running” and “is
the LED enabled or disabled,” as well as four new
functions, reset_sensor, enter_standby, exit_
standby, and handle_led_control.
When the LED is enabled, the behavior of the camera is
indistinguishable from the normal behavior. That is, when the
camera is in its standby state the LED is off and when the
camera is in its running state, the LED is on.
The legitimate firmware contains a function to reset and
configure the image sensor. This is called both from the
hardware initialization function and the handler for the USB
set interface request. It begins by deasserting the STANDBY
signal and asserting the #RESET. After a short spin loop, it
deasserts #RESET and, depending on the function argument,
deasserts STANDBY. It then proceeds to configure the image
sensor. We patch the firmware to call reset_sensor instead
of this configuration function in both locations. The reset_
sensor function reimplements the reset functionality but
adds a call to the function which writes to the I2C bus to
program the RESET register to bypass the STANDBY signal
(see Section IV-A). At this point, if the LED has been disabled
or the argument indicates that it should enter the standby
2There are several open source tools to perform this task, e.g., iSight
Firmware Tools [7], several of which include binary patching to fix bugs in
the USB interface descriptors.
3The final triple stores a single 0x00 byte to address 0xE600 which takes
the Intel 8051 core out of reset so that it can begin executing instructions.
state, the STANDBY signal is asserted to turn off the LED
which will have momentarily illuminated during the reset
sequence. Otherwise, the sensor is left running and the LED
is enabled so STANDBY remains deasserted and the LED
stays on. Finally, the reset_sensor function jumps into
the middle of the configuration function, just past the #RESET
and STANDBY manipulating code, in order to perform the rest
of the configuration.
The enter_standby and exit_standby functions
update the bit of state which records if the image sensor
is running or in standby. Then, based on whether the LED is
enabled or not, they deassert (resp. assert) STANDBY as needed
to turn the LED on (resp. off). Finally, these functions use
I2C to program the RESET register to enter or exit software
standby. Each location in the legitimate firmware which sets
the state of the STANDBY signal is patched to call its new,
corresponding standby function instead.
The final function, handle_led_control is responsible
for handling a new vendor-specific USB device request. The
main loop in the legitimate firmware which handles USB
device request “setup” packets is patched to instead call
handle_led_control. If the bRequest field of the
request does not match the new vendor-specific value, then
it jumps to the legitimate handler. Otherwise, based on the
wValue field of the request, the LED is enabled or disabled.
As with the other functions, the LED is then turned on if it
has been enabled and the image sensor is running. Otherwise,
it is turned off.
B. Demonstration application: iSeeYou
iSeeYou is a simple, native OS X application; see Figure 3.
When iSeeYou starts, it checks for the presence of a built-in
iSight using the appropriate vendor and product IDs. If the
iSight is found, iSeeYou initiates the reprogramming process
using the modified firmware described above. Once the camera
has been reprogrammed and has reenumerated, the start/stop
button begins/ends capturing and displaying video. The LED
Enable/LED Disable control sends USB device requests
with the new vendor-specific value to enable/disable the
indicator LED while video is being captured. Finally, when
the user quits iSeeYou, the camera is reprogrammed with the
legitimate firmware.
VI. VIRTUAL MACHINE ESCAPE
The reprogramability of the iSight firmware can be exploited
to effect a virtual machine escape whereby malware running
in a guest operating system is able to escape the confines of
the virtual machine and influence the host operating system.
One method is to reprogram the iSight from inside the
virtual machine to act as a USB Human Interface Device (HID)
such as a mouse or keyboard. Once the iSight reenumerates, it
would send mouse movements and clicks or key presses which
the host operating system would then interpret as actions from
the user.
To demonstrate the feasibility of a virtual machine escape
from a VirtualBox virtual machine, we implemented a USB
Fig. 3: iSeeYou running on a white MacBook “Core 2 Duo” capturing video from the internal iSight with the LED (the black
dot to the right of the square camera at the top, center of the display bezel) unilluminated.
HID keyboard which, once loaded, performs the following
actions in order:
1) send a “host key” press;
2) send command-space to open Spotlight;
3) send the key presses for “Terminal.app” one at a time;
4) wait a few seconds, send a return key press, and wait a
few more seconds for the Terminal to open;
5) send the key presses for a shell command followed by a
return key press;
6) disconnect from the USB bus and modify its USB device
descriptor to use the product ID 0x8300— the PID for
the iSight in its unprogrammed state; and
7) reenumerate.
The VirtualBox host key, which defaults to the left command
key on a Mac host, releases keyboard ownership, causing the
rest of the key presses to go to the host operating system
rather than to the guest operating system [42, Chapter 1].
Figure 4 shows an iSight that has been reprogrammed from
inside a VirtualBox virtual machine sending key presses to
Spotlight, instructing it to open Terminal.app.
When a new keyboard is first plugged into the computer,
the Keyboard Setup Assistant asks the user to press several
keys in order to determine the keyboard layout. This behavior
appears to be controlled by the vendor ID, product ID, and
device release number. By using the appropriate values for an
Apple USB keyboard, the assistant does not appear and there
is no visual indication that the operating system believes a
new keyboard has connected.
The shell command entered into the Terminal is uncon-
strained and could, for example, use curl to download arbitrary,
new code and run it.
After the iSight has finished typing commands, it reenumer-
ates as an unprogrammed iSight which causes the AppleUSB-
VideoSupport driver to reprogram it with the legitimate iSight
firmware, removing evidence that the iSight was the infection
vector.
Although we use the iSight to escape from the virtual
machine, in theory, any EZ-USB device which is accessible
from inside the virtual machine can be reprogrammed to
behave as a HID keyboard.
The one major limitation is that the USB device must be
connected to virtual machine before the attack is possible.
By default, virtual machine monitors do not provide this
connection for most devices and thus malware would need to
coerce the user into establishing the connection.
Even with the device connected to the virtual machine, there
is no feedback to the firmware that the attack is proceeding
as planned. All it can do is send key presses in response the
USB polling. If the user is sitting in front of the computer,
the key presses sent by the iSight may be apparent and the
Fig. 4: Virtual machine escape. The iSight has been reprogrammed to act as a USB keyboard from inside a VirtualBox virtual
machine and it is sending key presses to the host operating system. It is in the middle of entering “Terminal.app” into Spotlight.
user can interfere by performing an action such as typing
or clicking the mouse. One way to partially compensate is
to decrease the USB polling interval by changing the USB
endpoint descriptors in the firmware allowing the iSight to
send key presses more quickly.
Each operating system has its own policy which governs a
process’s ability to send USB device requests. On Linux, this
is controlled by udev. In Figure 4, we used sudo to bypass
the access controls. Alternatively, the appropriate permissions
could be granted to the user. One of these steps is required
even though the host operating system, OS X, imposes no
restrictions on the use of USB device requests. Since each
guest operating system controls access to the USB device
once it has been connected to the virtual machine, to perform
an escape, malware must first acquire sufficient privileges
in the guest operating system to reprogram the camera — a
potentially nontrivial feat.
VII. DEFENSES
There are several approaches one can envision to defend the
iSight against the attacks described in the previous sections.
One can change (1) the hardware, (2) the firmware on the EZ-
USB (unfortunately this is not effective, see below), or (3) the
software on the host system. See Table II for an overview of
possible defenses and their efficacy.
The most comprehensive defense would be to change the
hardware used in the iSight. See Section VIII for several
TABLE II: Overview of possible defenses.
Defense Deployable User Root
Change hardware No Yes Yes
Change firmware Yes No No
App Sandbox Yes Some No
iSightDefender Yes Yes No
A “Yes” in the Deployable column indicates that the
defense could be deployed to existing computers. A “Yes”
in the User (resp. Root) column indicates that the defense
would prevent an unprivileged (resp. root) process from
reprogramming the iSight. A “Some” indicates that some
reprogramming attempts would be prevented but others
allowed.
secure hardware designs. Of course, changing the hardware is
not a deployable solution for existing devices.
If the hardware must remain the same, then if the firmware
on the camera could be changed to disallow future reprogram-
ming, then the camera would be secure against our attacks.
Unfortunately, the “Firmware Load” USB device request used
to reprogram the 8051 core is handled entirely by the EZ-USB
device itself and cannot be blocked or handled by the 8051
itself [13, Section 3.8]. Thus no matter how one programs
the device’s firmware, it can be reprogrammed by an attacker
who can send basic USB messages to the camera.
Apple deploys sandboxing technology called the App
Sandbox4 [2] which can prevent applications inside the
sandbox from accessing the iSight. Specifically, the com.
apple.security.device.camera entitlement enables
an application to capture still images and video from cameras,
including the internal iSight. The com.apple.security.
device.usb entitlement enables applications to access USB
devices.
Any App Sandbox–protected application lacking the usb
entitlement would be prohibited from reprogramming the
iSight and thus prohibited from disabling the indicator LED.
Although an application with the usb entitlement but lacking
the camera entitlement would be prohibited from using the
high-level APIs for accessing the camera, such as the QTKit
API [4], it could easily reprogram the camera to not appear
as a USB video class (UVC) device and instead transfer the
frames of video using a custom protocol.
The major drawback to using the App Sandbox to protect
the camera is that applications need to opt into the protection,
something malware is unlikely to do. Worse, the App Sandbox
has, at times, been broken allowing applications to escape
from the restrictions [12, 37].
Perhaps the best way to defend against reprogramming
the iSight without changing the hardware is to modify the
operating system to prevent particular USB device requests
from being sent to the camera. We have built such a defense
structured as an OS X kernel extension called iSightDefender.
When iSight is powered for the first time, it enumerates
with vendor ID 0x05ac and product ID 0x8300 and is
programmed with the legitimate firmware via the AppleUSB-
VideoSupport kernel extension as described in Sections III-C
and IV-B. When it reenumerates with product ID 0x8501
the kernel matches and loads the normal drivers as well as
iSightDefender.
I/O Kit kernel drivers are written in a subset of C++
and each USB device is represented by an object of class
IOUSBDevice which is responsible for communicating
with the hardware by sending messages to objects in lower
layers of the USB stack. When iSightDefender is started,
it overwrites the C++ virtual method table of its “provider”
IOUSBDevice to point to the virtual method table of a
subclass of IOUSBDevice.5 The subclass overrides the four
DeviceRequest member functions. The overridden imple-
mentations check if the device request is for the “Firmware
Load” vendor-specific request and, if so, log the attempt in
the system log and block the request.
iSightDefender is able to block all user space reprogram-
ming attempts,6 including those mounted from within a virtual
4Formerly codenamed Seatbelt.
5There seems to be no supported mechanism for interposing on USB device
requests. The authors appreciate the irony of using virtual table hijacking —
a common hacker technique — for defending against attack.
6In fact, iSightDefender worked so well that one author spent more than
an hour attempting to diagnose (nonexistent) problems with iSeeYou before
noticing the tell-tale lines in the system log indicating that iSightDefender
had been loaded by a computer restart and it was blocking reprogramming
requests.
machine. The latter requires some care as the normal drivers
that match against the IOUSBDevice are unloaded and the
virtual machine monitor’s own driver is loaded in their place.
Using iSightDefender raises the bar for attackers by requir-
ing the attacker to have root privileges in order to reprogram
the iSight. In some sense, this is the strongest possible software-
based defense. Since malware running as root would have
the ability to replace or modify kernel code, any defense
implemented in the kernel can, theoretically, be bypassed.
Despite this limitation, we believe it is a step in the right
direction and encourage its use.
iSightDefender, and its source code, is freely available.7
VIII. SECURE CAMERA DESIGNS
When designing a secure camera, there are two main consid-
erations. First, for sensors such as cameras and microphones,
an indicator that the sensor is recording is essential to prevent
surreptitious recording. (Although laptop microphones do not,
in general, have indicators, it is common for stand alone USB
microphones; see [27] for an example.) For the highest level of
assurance that the indicator cannot be bypassed, the indicator
should be controlled completely by hardware.
Second, as with any peripheral connected to the computer,
a vulnerability in the software running on the peripheral or
the ability to reprogram the software enables an attacker to
leverage all of the capabilities of the peripheral. Section II
contains numerous examples of this. The virtual machine
escape in Section VI is another example where an attacker
leverages the USB connection and the ability of the EZ-USB
to mimic any USB device to the host computer. Apple’s most
recent FaceTime cameras in its 2013 MacBook Air model
eschews USB 2.0. Instead, the camera is connected to the host
computer over PCIe [33]. Vulnerabilities in the camera would
potentially enable an attacker to have DMA access to the host
system. This is a significantly stronger capability than USB
access.
A. Secure indicators
Laptop cameras are typically constructed by pairing a
CMOS image sensor-on-a-chip (e.g., the Micron MT9V112
found in the iSight or the Toshiba TCM8230MB(A)) with
a separate microcontroller that handles communication with
the host computer (e.g., the EZ-USB FX2LP found in the
older MacBooks or the Vimicro VC0358 [55] found in more
recent MacBook Pros [26]. There are, of course, many possible
combinations of image sensors and microcontrollers one could
use.
Image sensors-on-a-chip tend to have a number of common
features that can be used to build a secure indicator.
1) Separate power connection for CMOS sensor itself. For
example, VAAPIX on the MT9V112 powers its pixel
array and PVDD on the TCM8230MB(A) powers its
photo diode. A GPIO pin on the microcontroller can
be connected to both the LED driver circuit and the
7https://github.com/stevecheckoway/iSightDefender
CMOS sensor power supply circuit. Whenever images
are to be captured, the microcontroller sets its GPIO pin
appropriately, power is supplied to the sensor and the
LED turns on.
2) #RESET pins. The LED driver circuit can be connected
to the #RESET pin and a GPIO pin on the microcontroller.
The microcontroller would hold the image sensor in reset
whenever it was not capturing images. Compared to the
power connection for CMOS sensor, holding the entire
sensor-on-a-chip in reset means that before images could
be captured, the sensor would need to be reconfigured.
Reconfiguring typically means sending a few dozen bytes
over an I2C or SPI bus. This introduces a slight delay.
3) Output clocks and synchronization signals. Image sensors
typically latch outputs on one edge of an output clock
signal and image consumers are expected to read the
data on the other edge of the clock. In addition, there
are signals used to indicate which part of the image the
latched data represents. For example, the MT9V112 has
FRAME_VALID and LINE_VALID signals indicating
when it’s outputting a frame or a line within the frame,
respectively, whereas the TCM8230MB(A) has VD and
HD for vertical and horizontal synchronization. These
pins can also be used to control the LED by adding some
simple hardware that drives the LED if it has seen one
of these signals change in the past few milliseconds.
Depending on the specifics of the image sensor output
signal, a retriggerable, monostable multivibrator can be
used to drive the LED as long as its input changes
sufficiently often. The multivibrator’s output pulse width
needs to be set appropriately such that it is triggered
frequently enough to continuously drive the LED while
images are being recorded.
Some care must be taken when using these output
signals. The exact meanings of the signals can frequently
be changed by configuring the sensor. This is analogous
to the situation with the iSight where we changed the
meaning of the STANDBY signal.
An all-in-one design where the image sensor is integrated
with the microcontroller which communicates to the host
computer is likely to have fewer options for a secure design.
A dedicated output pin which could drive an indicator LED
would suffice. However, hardware designers are typically
loathe to dedicate pins to specific functions, instead a variety
of functions tend to be multiplexed over a single pin.
It is likely that, even in this case, there would be a separate
power connection for the CMOS sensor. As with the two-
chip design above, the LED driver circuit and a power supply
circuit could be driven by a GPIO.
B. Secure firmware
Although using one of the secure indicator designs described
above will ensure the LED will turn on when the camera turns
on, it does nothing to protect against reprogramming attacks.
For this, we make four concrete recommendations which,
taken together, can secure the firmware on the camera. These
apply more generally to any peripheral or embedded system
connected to a host computer.
1) Store the firmware in nonvolatile storage on the camera
module. Most commercial off-the-self (COTS) microcon-
trollers contain some amount of nonvolatile storage, such
as flash memory, to hold firmware.8 By programming the
firmware at the factory, one avoids the possibility that
the legitimate firmware will be replaced by an attacker
on the host system before being downloaded to the
microcontroller.
Depending on the specific requirements of the system,
the factory programming could be the complete firmware
or a secure loader designed to load cryptographically
signed firmware from the host (see below).
2) Use a microcontroller which can block unwanted
firmware reprogramming attempts. It is essential that
trusted code running on the microcontroller is able to
block reprogramming attempts for illegitimate firmware.
3) Firmware updates, if necessary, should be cryptographi-
cally signed and the signature verified before applying the
update. This requires both nonvolatile storage for the code
to verify the signature and a microcontroller which can
block reprogramming attempts. Since microcontrollers
are typically resource constrained devices, choosing an
appropriate signature scheme which can be implemented
within the constraints is important. Scheme selection
is outside the scope of this paper but we note that
recent microcontrollers have started to contain specialized
crypto instructions which can reduce code size and
increase efficiency. For example, Rohde et al. [49] use
specialized AES instructions in some Atmel ATxmega
microcontrollers to implement the Merkle signature
scheme.
4) Require root/administrator privileges to send reprogram-
ming requests. Strictly as a matter of defense in depth,
software running on the host system should restrict
reprogramming attempts. Thus, even if the hardware and
firmware defenses prove inadequate, this added layer of
protection can still defend against some attacks.
Adding this sort of restriction typically involves a
device-specific kernel module (our iSightDefender is
an example). This may be more difficult for plug and
play devices expected to conform to standard protocols
and interact with generic drivers such as USB video
class (UVC) or USB human interface device (HID) class
devices.
The inability of the EZ-USB to block reprogramming
attempts indicates that this widely-used microcontroller is
inappropriate for use in any system where security is a
consideration.
8Microcontrollers without nonvolatile storage can be paired with external
nonvolatile storage, such as flash or an EEPROM, to the same effect.
IX. DISCUSSION
Although some webcams, such as the Logitech QuickCam
Pro 9000, come with an explicit “LED control” that can disable
the LED [57], such controls are not the norm and, in fact,
are a very bad idea from both a security and a privacy stand
point. Giving the user the ability to disable a privacy feature
is tantamount to giving malware the same capability.
A particularly unsavory element of the hacker culture,
“ratters,” install malware bundled with remote administration
tools (RATs) on victims’ computers. There are several popular
RATs, including Blackshades and DarkComet, which come
with a variety of “features” such as keyloggers, the ability
to install additional malware, and the ability to record video
and sound using the webcam. Rats are often installed with
the goal of spying on women.
RATs and the ratters who use them have recently come
under public scrutiny after Miss Teen USA Cassidy Wolf’s
webcam was used by ratter Jared Abrahams to capture her
naked images without her knowledge [15]. Abrahams arrest
and guilty plea came on the heels of an ars technica exposé
on ratters [1].
A commonly asked question on forums devoted to ratting,
such as the Hack Forums “Remote Administrator Tools”
forum, is how can one disable the webcam’s LED. In one
representative thread, started by forum user “Phisher Cat” [44],
the poster asks
So as all of you know, newer laptops have a
light when a laptop webcam turns on, and so this
scares the slave.
Is it theoretically possible for a RAT to disable
this light?
disturbingly referring to his victim as “the slave,” as is common
in this subcommunity. The first response by “Jabaar” notes that
“[p]eople have been trying to figure this out for a very long
time. The light won’t be able to be disabled as it is built into
the hardware.” Others agree: “Capital Steez” writes that there
is “no way to disable it,”9 and “FBITM” concurs “there [i]s
no way to do” it. Still others suggest using social engineering
in an attempt to convince the victim that the LED is normal,
for example, “Orochimaru” writes, “You can’t physically turn
it off but you can use social engineering to fool them. Maybe
send an error or warning msgbox that says ‘Camera is now
updating, please do not disturb’ or something.” There are many
such threads on Hack Forums alone, all expressing similar
sentiments: disabling LEDs is a capability the ratters really
want to have but do not think is possible.
Unfortunately, the implications of surreptitiously capturing
video do not end with privacy violations like school officials
and ratters spying on people. As part of the general trend of
growing frustration with passwords as an authentication mecha-
nism, some companies are moving to biometric identification;
in particular, using facial recognition on video taken with
9With what appears to be a complete lack of empathy for his own hapless
victims, “Capital Steez” further comments, “If I was using my laptop at night
and that light randomly turned on I would freak the fuck out” [44]. Indeed.
webcams. For example, BioID is software-as-a-service which
provides biometric identification to online service providers
using a webcam [8]. Luxand’s FaceSDK is a cross-platform
software development kit that uses the webcam to identify the
user [32].
In principle, this sort of facial recognition is trivially
defeated by providing the expected picture or video to the
software performing the authentication. Malware that can
capture video of the victim can replay that video to authenticate
to the given service. This is not a new attack. The Android
Face Unlock system was defeated shortly after being released
by holding a picture of the face in front of the camera [9].
Duc and Minh [16] describes weaknesses of several facial
recognition authentication systems in the presence of pictures.
By disabling the indicator LED before capturing video, the
victims have no way of knowing that their accounts may be
compromised.
Although the ability to disable the LED can lead to serious
privacy and security problems, there are at least two legitimate
use cases. The first is that some people really do not want the
LED on while they are recording. We do not find this to be a
compelling use as the benefit does not seem to outweigh the
potential cost; however, others may value this more than we
do.
The second use case is significantly more compelling: laptop
recovery. For example, the OS X version of Adeona software
captures pictures using the laptop’s internal iSight to aid in
recovery of a laptop that has been stolen by taking a picture
of the thief [47, 48]. The LANrev software used in the Lower
Merion School District incident discussed in the introduction
had a similar “Theft Track” feature which is how the school
officials were able to obtain pictures of students. For this use,
one does not want the thief to know he is being observed.
X. RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
The authors followed responsible disclosure practices by
disclosing the LED disabling vulnerability to Apple product
security team on July 16, 2013 and the virtual machine escape
on August 1, 2013. The disclosures included the source code
for iSeeYou and the virtual machine escape as well as directions
for mounting both attacks. Apple employees followed up
several times but did not inform us of any possible mitigation
plans. The iSightDefender code was also provided to Apple
and is now publicly available.10
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that being able to reprogram the iSight
from user space is a powerful capability. Coupled with the
hardware design flaw that allows the indicator LED hardware
interlocks to be bypassed, malware is able to covertly capture
video, either for spying purposes or as part of a broader
scheme to break facial recognition authentication. Although
the iSightDefender defense described in Section VII raises the
barrier for malware, including RATs, to take control of the
10https://github.com/stevecheckoway/iSightDefender
camera without being detected by requiring root privileges,
the correct way to prevent disabling the LED is a hardware
solution.
In this paper, we have examined only a single generation
of webcams produced by a single manufacturer. In future
work, we plan to expand the scope of our investigation to
include newer Apple webcams (such as their most recent high-
definition FaceTime cameras) as well as webcams installed in
other popular laptop brands.
The virtual machine escape described in Section VI demon-
strates the danger that reprogrammable peripheral devices
such as keyboards and mice pose. We plan to undertake a
much broader examination of these devices in an attempt to
understand the security implications of connecting one device
to a computer which can, under attacker control, pretend to be
a wide range of devices. One particularly promising direction is
to study how drivers react to malformed or malicious responses
from devices. In the worst case, a user space program could
reprogram a peripheral device which in turn exploits a poorly
written driver to inject code into the kernel.
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